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Two decades ago, Japan’s seemingly inexorable rise
was stalled by a crisis whose contours bear an uncan-
ny resemblance to the present global financial tur-
moil.During the early 1990s,abundant liquidity – fu-
eled by easy monetary policies and financial deregu-
lation – had inflated unprecedented bubbles in
Japan’s real estate and stock markets and funded a
huge build up in bank lending to corporates (see
Figures 1 and 2).When these twin bubbles burst, the
effects slowly rippled through the rest of the econo-
my.While growth faltered,the full impact was not felt
for some time,and hopes were raised by signs of a re-
covery in the middle of the decade. However, it was
not long before the grim realities of a post-bubble re-
cession became forcefully apparent – by 1997, much
like the panic that gripped the globe following
Lehman’s collapse last fall,Japan was on the verge of
a financial meltdown.Escalating losses on real estate
loans and a renewed stockmarket crash led to a
breakdown in the interbank market and a wave of
high-profile failures in the financial sector. In turn,
these shocks had a devastating impact on real activi-
ty. For the first time in decades, Japan had been
pushed into a recession and inflation locked in nega-
tive territory.
Despite significant policy efforts, the crisis ultimate-
ly took a major toll on the Japanese economy, re-
flected in a “lost”decade of economic stagnation and
a sharp rise in public debt (Figure 3). In 2002, unem-
ployment had risen to a post-war high of 51/2 percent,
and non-performing loan (NPL) ratios peaked at al-
most 9 percent. Meanwhile, gross public debt more
than doubled to over 160 percent of GDP, by far the
highest among advanced economies.
However,the corner was finally turned shortly there-
after. A more pro-active approach to dealing with
capital shortages and distressed assets in the form of
problem loans helped to reduce systemic stress in the
financial system. A virtuous cycle gained a foothold
as the banking system was resuscitated while corpo-
rates redressed the underlying imbalances of the bub-
ble period by shedding the triple excesses of debt,ca-
pacity and labor. Resolution of the crisis heralded a
prolonged period of prosperity between 2003 and
2007,on the back of rising corporate profits,expand-
ing employment and surging exports supported by ro-
bust global growth. This article looks back on this
episode and draws lessons from the exceptional mon-
etary and financial sector policies that Japan em-
ployed to stabilize its economy and rebuild its bank-
ing system,in the hope that they may shed some light
on the way out of the present crisis (for more details,
see Kang et al. 2009a and b).
Liquidity support and credit easing: damage control
through unconventional monetary policies
As its crisis unfolded, Japan confronted an evolving
and increasingly unprecedented set of challenges.
Initially, the authorities needed to accommodate the
asset bubble collapse and ensure that corporate
deleveraging was orderly.Over time,as the problems
worsened, attention shifted to preventing an implo-
sion of the financial system and providing extraordi-
nary macroeconomic support to stave off a deepen-
ing recession and stubborn deflationary pressures.In
the final stage,the challenge was to move beyond sim-
ple stabilization and place the economy back on the
path of robust growth by undertaking a thorough
clean-up of bank and corporate balance sheets. The
nature of Japan’s policy responses transformed in line
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After some delay,monetary policy
was gradually loosened through
the 1990s, with interest rates
falling all the way to zero by the
end of the decade – the first time
this had happened in an advanced
country in the post-war era
(Figure 4).However,the economy
remained unresponsive as dele-
veraging pressures subdued the
demand for credit and the mone-
tary transmission mechanism was
disrupted by the crippling of the fi-
nancial and corporate sectors
(Figure 5).Unable to lower policy
rates further, the Bank of Japan
(BoJ) had to go beyond the text-
books and venture into uncharted
territory to stimulate the economy
and fight deflation.It resorted to a
series of innovative and untested
steps to ease credit conditions,
centered on exceptional measures
to provide liquidity, including ex-
panding the range of collateral,di-
rect asset purchases,and quantita-
tive easing under a zero interest
rate policy (ZIRP) between 2001
and 2006 (Fijuki et al. 2001;
Shirakawa 2003).This period pro-
vides a rare glimpse into the mys-
terious world of unconventional
monetary policy that a number of
advanced economies (including
the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada) have em-
barked upon in response to the
present crisis.What then are some
of the lessons that can be gleaned
from the Japanese experience? 
First and foremost, generous liq-
uidity support by the central bank
can help in the face of a pro-
nounced slowdown and deflation-
ary pressures.To substitute for the
impaired interbank market, the
BoJ expanded the range and flex-
ibility of its monetary instruments.
These measures evolved in re-
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sponse to changing market condi-
tions and focused primarily on
broadening the range of eligible
collateral to include corporate
bonds,loans on deeds,asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) and
other forms of asset-backed securi-
ties (ABS); providing liquidity at
longer terms by extending the ma-
turity of bill purchases and Japa-
nese Government Bond (JGB) re-
pos from six months to a year; and
increasing the number of counter-
parties for JGB purchases and
commercial paper repo operations.
Second, direct measures to jump-
start credit can be useful while pri-
vate markets remain dysfunction-
al and volatile.The BoJ resorted to
a variety of unconventional mea-
sures to support corporate lending
(Figure 6). In 1998, to help firms
with their end-of-year funding,the
BoJ established a temporary lend-
ing facility to refinance part of the
increase in loans by financial insti-
tutions.In 2003,the BoJ initiated a
program to assist small and medi-
um-sized enterprises (SMEs) by
purchasing ABS and ABCP
backed by SME loans. This com-
plemented generous credit guar-
antees on SME lending by the
Ministry of Finance that provided
100 percent coverage to banks
against losses and reached nearly
JPY 30 trillion (6 percent of GDP)
by 2001.At the same time,the BoJ
took unprecedented steps to ad-
dress the capital shortage in banks.
In the face of declining share
prices, banks’ large equity hold-
ings constrained their ability to ex-
tend credit and take on new risk.
In response, the BoJ introduced a
program in 2002 to purchase equi-
ty directly from banks at market
prices.
Third, effective communication is
vital for explaining unconvention-
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Figure 6markets and the public. The BoJ strengthened both
its explanation of, and its commitment to, prolonged
easing through its communication strategy during the
quantitative easing period. In October 2003, the BoJ
formalized its commitment by announcing two nec-
essary conditions for ending quantitative easing – that
core inflation be non-negative for a few months and
that a majority of BoJ Policy Board members forecast
positive core inflation.As a result,it became increas-
ingly clear that a more expansionary stance would be
maintained until deflation ended.This commitment,
which was lacking during the early stages of the
bank’s response,helped to better manage market ex-
pectations about the future path of interest rates.
Fourth,temporary and limited coordination between
fiscal and monetary policy can help support econom-
ic activity, with due attention to risks to the balance
sheet and independence of the central bank. During
the initial phase of Japan’s crisis, the BoJ had indi-
cated that it regarded the downturn as stemming
mainly from problems in the financial and corporate
sectors, so that the onus rested with fiscal and struc-
tural policy (Cargill et al.2000).However,greater co-
ordination with fiscal policy was visible after the
adoption of quantitative easing, with the BoJ gradu-
ally increasing its purchases of long-term government
bonds from JPY 400 billion to JPY 1.2 trillion per
month. Such purchases were generally regarded by
market participants as helping to place a cap on long-
term yields.Over time,assets that could be purchased
by the BoJ were expanded to include commercial pa-
per,corporate bonds,equities and ABS,although ac-
tual amounts were relatively limited (Figure 7).
Purchases were balanced against possible drawbacks,
including jeopardizing the BoJ’s independence and
credibility in financial markets;
exposing the central bank balance
sheet to potentially large capital
losses once the economy recov-
ered; facilitating fiscal profligacy;
and the risk of a spike in yields
when these operations were
wound down. The quantitative
easing policy saw the BoJ’s bal-
ance sheet expand from 18 per-
cent of GDP in 1998 to a high of
about 31 percent of GDP in 2006.
Fifth, an exit strategy from un-
conventional monetary opera-
tions must be conceived at an ear-
ly stage, although support should
only be withdrawn after clear signals of recovery
emerge. In marked contrast to the mistimed reversal
of ZIRP in August 2000 – when the lifting of policy
rates amid fledgling signs of a pickup contributed to
a renewed downturn – the BoJ was able to exit from
quantitative easing relatively smoothly, aided by
transparent and open communication. After the
economy started to recover in 2003,it took some time
before deflation was ended and the preannounced
conditions for ending quantitative easing were met.
In March 2006,the BoJ began shifting to a more nor-
mal monetary framework, indicating that it would
gradually drain liquidity through open market oper-
ations while keeping overnight interest rates effec-
tively at zero.The Japanese money market,which had
withered during the late 1990s, was revived, as insti-
tutions relied less on the BoJ for funding which had
been made available at penal rates relative to normal
times and the opportunity cost of idle bank balances
rose, stimulating credit growth. With the recovery
drawn out and inflationary pressures subdued, the
BoJ was also able to avoid losses and yield spikes by
holding JGBs to maturity. However, the BoJ has not
been able to fully unwind its stock purchases: as of
March 2008, it held about JPY 1.4 trillion JPY, down
from a peak of JPY 2 trillion.At the time,capital gains
on these shareholdings were estimated at around JPY
800 billion,but a large part has likely been wiped out
by the collapse in global stock markets during the cur-
rent crisis.
Ultimately,however,unconventional policies are not
a panacea and carry a cost. Japan found that while
generous liquidity support helped limit the damage,
it also had negative side-effects, notably in the form
of compounding the breakdown in money markets,
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compressed credit spreads,and pressure on bank prof-
its. Ample liquidity and low interest rates could also
have reduced incentives for restructuring – for in-
stance, by easing financing constraints for both sound
and insolvent borrowers, they may have delayed the
recognition of bad loans and undermined market dis-
cipline.This may have been a necessary price to pay for
maintaining financial stability and preventing deflation
from worsening. However, the costs increased the
longer unconventional policies were in place,putting a
premium on rapid progress to fix the financial system
and restructure all affected balance sheets.
In the end, generous liquidity provision helped fore-
stall an immediate systemic crisis and arrest the de-
cline in output, but it could not adequately address
the fundamental problem of an undercapitalized
banking system. As discussed in the next section,
Japan found that a lasting recovery could only be
achieved by tackling the financial
and corporate sector problems
that lay at the heart of the crisis.
Restructuring banks and
rehabilitating borrowers:
financial sector imperatives for a
sustained recovery
As Japan’s crisis intensified and its
roots became clearer, financial
sector policies assumed center
stage. The eventual strategy re-
volved around restructuring
banks,encouraging them to recog-
nize problem loans and raise new
capital,and in some cases seek out
public funds or exit the sector.
After a subdued start,the govern-
ment ended up injecting public
funds of nearly 10 percent of GDP
to recapitalize the banking system
and dispose of problem loans
(Figure 8). At the same time, the
banking system underwent signif-
icant consolidation, with several
large banks and many smaller in-
stitutions either closed or merged.
By 2003,bank share prices started
to recover,as NPLs began to trend
down and capital ratios stabilized.
Over 70 percent of the public cap-
ital has since been repaid, reflect-
ing the success of Japan’s restructuring policies.In the
final analysis, tighter supervision, judicious use of
public funds and a sound framework for restructur-
ing distressed assets proved decisive. Japan’s experi-
ences suggest a number of important ingredients for
reviving the financial sector.
First, losses associated with distressed assets have to
be fully recognized at an early stage. Delays in rec-
ognizing problem loans exacerbated Japan’s crisis
and postponed a sustained recovery.For many years,
weak accounting practices and regulatory forbear-
ance masked the NPL problem and limited incentives
for remedial action (Figure 9). To some extent, this
reflected a lack of understanding of the size of the
NPL problem and the initial belief that a recovery
would soon take hold. The delay in recognizing the
losses proved costly, not just in terms of taxpayer
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Figure 9tainty about the health of bank balance sheets
weighed on market sentiment and insolvent “zom-
bie” firms were allowed to linger (Caballero et al.
2008). At a minimum, earlier action to recognize
problem loans and raise adequate provisioning would
have helped identify the capital shortage and jump-
start the process of restructuring.
Second,resistance to the use of public funds must be
overcome by underscoring the importance of finan-
cial stability to taxpayers. In the mid-1990s, public
backlash over the ineffective injection of public funds
into the failed jusen mortgage financing companies
made it very difficult for the authorities to consider
additional public funds for some time,limiting policy
flexibility. Overcoming public resistance to bank
bailouts and the stigma attached to public capital was
crucial in forging a final solution.
Third, public funds available for cleaning up balance
sheets need to be adequate and conditional on strict
performance criteria. The BoJ and others pushed
strongly for the government to inject public funds as
a means of freeing banks’ capital constraints and re-
viving the credit channel (Table). Early attempts at
public recapitalization came with few conditions and
without a comprehensive examination or clean-up of
bank balance sheets.As a result,they failed to restore
health to the banking system or generate a sustained
macroeconomic impact.To resolve the NPL problem,
the government ultimately adopted a more forceful
approach to using public funds,concentrating on four
key elements:
• Ensuring realistic valuation of bad assets. The
strategy began with so-called “special inspections”
focusing on large borrowers,which confirmed that
bank self-assessments of asset quality were overly
optimistic and that NPLs had been significantly
understated. Starting in 2002, prudential norms
were strengthened by introducing mark-to-market
accounting,stricter loan classification and more re-
alistic loan-loss provisioning (Figure 10).
• Accelerating NPL disposals. Under the so-called
“Program for Financial Revival,” banks were re-
quired to accelerate the disposal of NPLs from
their balance sheet within two to three years by
selling them directly to the market,pursuing bank-
ruptcy procedures or by rehabilitating borrowers
through out-of-court workouts. Remaining loans
would be sold to the Resolution and Collection
Corporation (RCC), which was charged with dis-
posing of bad assets of failed banks.
• Improving bank capital. Around JPY 121/2trillion
(about 21/2 percent of GDP) of public funds was
used to recapitalize banks, mainly through pre-
ferred stock or subordinated debt. In the later
stages,in exchange for public funds,banks were re-
quired to write down the capital of existing share-
holders, replace senior management and submit a
reorganization plan to be reviewed regularly by the
authorities.Banks were also required to undertake
governance reforms consistent with Basel Com-
mittee guidelines, such as appointing outside di-
rectors and establishing a board audit committee.
• Strengthening supervision. In 1998, the Financial
Supervisory Authority (FSA) was created,consol-
idating supervision from the Ministry of Finance
(MoF) and other government agencies into a sin-
gle entity.A new law was also passed, authorizing
the FSA to prescribe prudential rules and apply
prompt corrective action when rules were
breached or where authorized institutions were
viewed as unsafe or unsound.
Fourth, rehabilitating distressed
borrowers is the other side of the
coin in a financial crisis and can
support bank restructuring. In
Japan, the large write-offs and
debt restructuring by banks were
instrumental in promoting the
needed deleveraging of the cor-
porate sector.To facilitate the re-
structuring process, the govern-
ment established the Industrial
Revitalization Corporation of Ja-
pan (IRCJ) in 2003 to purchase
distressed loans from banks and
work with creditors. To support
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 coverage  18.6 3.6  8.2
a) 
Asset purchases 9.8  1.9  9.6  98.0
Capital injection 12.4  2.4  10.2  82.3
Others 6.0  1.1  4.9  81.7
Total 46.8  9.0  32.9  70.3
 excluding grants 28.2  5.4  24.7  87.6
a) 10.4 trillionyenis coveredby the taxpayers, with the remaining amount
scheduled to be covered by deposit insurance fees paid by financial institu-
tions.
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private sector-led restructuring, the government also
reformed the insolvency system, introduced guide-
lines for out-of-court corporate workouts and up-
graded the accounting and auditing framework. In
the end,these measures helped to create a market for
restructuring distressed assets,drawing in private cap-
ital and expertise, including from overseas.
Fifth, a centralized asset management approach can
accelerate the cleaning-up of bank balance sheets
(Hoshi and Kashyap 1999; Kang 2003). Government
purchases and sales of NPLs through the RCC and
the IRCJ helped jumpstart the restructuring process
by enhancing price discovery, resolving credit dis-
putes and providing legal clarity and accountability.
They also allowed bank management to concentrate
on extending new loans and reforming their business
operations.With asset prices recovering, these inter-
ventions cost taxpayers far less than their original
price tag – the IRCJ even managed to generate a
small profit before shutting down in 2007.
Finally, to restore market discipline and minimize
moral hazard, an exit strategy needs to be devel-
oped for divesting public shares in the banking sys-
tem and unwinding other financial sector interven-
tions. In Japan, the shift from a blanket guarantee
to partial deposit insurance and the gradual repay-
ment of public funds were fairly orderly and
smooth.However,some banks are still struggling to
repay their public funds and the relatively gradual
withdrawal of public support for SMEs may also
have held back the restructuring of smaller firms,




the difficulty of combating a post-
bubble recession rooted in pri-
vate-sector profligacy and an
over-extended financial sector.
Compared to more typical cyclical
downturns, such episodes can be
longer-lasting and call for re-
sponses that fall outside of the
usual policy toolkit. In the short-
term, policymakers must be flexi-
ble and willing to employ a broad
range of measures to stabilize the
financial system and stem the de-
cline in output and prices, includ-
ing aggressive fiscal and monetary
stimulus. To lay the ground for a robust recovery,
damaged balance sheets, of both creditors and
debtors,must then be painstakingly rebuilt.The chal-
lenges do not end there. Exit from the exceptional
macroeconomic and financial sector policies necessi-
tated by the crisis must be conceived early and com-
municated convincingly in order to guide expecta-
tions and prevent longer-term damage to growth and
price stability. In addition, the actual exit must be
carefully timed and only implemented when clear
signs of a recovery emerge. Given the inescapable
parallels with the current crisis,it would serve global
policymakers well to cast a careful eye on Japan’s ex-
periences.
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